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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the first amendment permits Shoreline Press, Inc. to
be held liable in a false light claim by a private plaintiff for publication of an erroneous statement about a matter not of public concern
when the newspaper neither knew of the statement's existence nor
of its falsity?
2. Whether the first amendment requires, at minimum, proof that
Shoreline acted negligently in publishing an erroneous statement
before liability attaches in a false light claim.
3. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur satisfies constitutional
requirements of fault where there is no evidence demonstrating how
the statement appeared and where Shoreline cannot rebut the inference of negligence and will be held liable even though blameless.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The order of the United States District Court for the District of
Marshall is unreported, and contained in the Record on Appeal
(hereinafter "R." 1-7). The opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit is unreported and contained in
the Record on Appeal (R. 8-9).
JURISDICTION
A formal statement of jurisdiction has been waived in accordance with Rule III(F) 1986 Rules of the Benton National Moot
Court Competition in Information and Privacy.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The text of the following constitutional provision relevant to
the determination of this case is set forth in Appendix B: U.S.
Const. amend. I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit. It arises
out of a false light invasion of privacy claim by Marshall attorney
Bradley Stark (hereinafter "Respondent"), filed against Shoreline
Press, Inc. (hereinafter "Shoreline"), stemming from Shoreline's erroneous report that Respondent had filed for bankruptcy.
On Wednesday, May 9, 1984, a newspaper reporter employed by
Shoreline wrote an article for publication in Shoreline's weekly
"Law News" column. She composed the article on a personal computer in her home (R. 2). Using a modem, which allows computers
to "communicate" with each other through telephone lines, the reporter entered her personal password entitling her to access Shoreline's state-of-the-art computer, and transmitted the finished article
(R. 2, 3). It is uncontroverted that the reporter's article as transmitted contained no reference to Respondent (R. 3). The reporter's article was reviewed Thursday, May 10, 1984, by the business editor,
who gained access to the article stored in the newspaper's mainframe computer only after entering his personal password. Again, no
reference to Respondent appeared anywhere in the article (R. 3). On
Friday, May 11, 1984, the same editor electronically paginated the
"Law News" column for printing and, still, the article contained no
mention of Respondent (R. 3). However, when the "Law News" column appeared in print on Monday, May 14, 1984, this single sentence was discovered at the bottom of the column (R. 2):
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Personal injury lawyer Bradley Stark, with business in the doldrums,
filed bankruptcy last week.
Eight days later, Respondent sued Shoreline alleging that he
had been placed in a false light by the publication and demanding
punitive and compensatory damages (R. 2). The parties agree that
there is no evidence of computer malfunction. Further, the parties
stipulate that the sentence could have been inserted by an outside
"hacker" who breached Shoreline's system through use of the telephone lines (R. 3). It is also possible that one of Shoreline's employees entered the sentence in the system without leaving a clue as to
his or her identity (R. 3). Shoreline does not dispute that the statement about Respondent was false and was not about a matter of
public concern (R. 4, 9). Nor does Shoreline dispute that Respondent is not a public figure (R. 9).
The United States District Court for the district of Marshall
granted summary judgment to the Respondent, holding Shoreline
strictly liable for the statement's publication. The court found that
there were no constitutional constraints on false light claims involving private persons and nonpublic concerns and held that Marshall's
common law strict liability for defamation actions also applied to
false light claims (R. 5, 6). Alternatively, the district court found
that if some showing of fault is required, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur could be used to satisfy the plaintiffs burden (R. 6).
The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The circuit court determined that constitutional considerations require that the plaintiff show fault before
recovery will be allowed for the publication of damaging falsehoods,
and reversed the district court's finding that strict liability is appropriate (R. 9). Further, while agreeing that only negligence need be
shown, the circuit court rejected the district court's determination
that the plaintiff may use res ipsa loquitur to establish the constitutional requirement of fault (R. 9). This Court granted Shoreline's
writ of certiorari on June 30, 1986 (R. 10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court's precedents require Respondent to prove that
Shoreline acted with actual malice when it published the erroneous
statement. In the only two false light cases to come before the
Court, actual malice was the standard applied. Moreover, even if
Shoreline intentionally published the statement, Respondent would
be required to show that Shoreline also knew of its falsity before
recovering on his false light claim. The Court has held that actual
malice is the proper standard of fault for false light, at least when
the speech complained of is a subject of public interest. Here, the
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statement that Respondent filed for bankruptcy is a matter of public interest, even though the parties agree that it is not a subject of
public concern. Further, it makes sense to continue to adopt a public interest standard for false light claims, notwithstanding the
maintenance of a public figure/public concern standard for defamation actions. Different standards are justified because of the different interests advanced by, and in competition with, defamation and
false light actions. Defamation protects one from injury to reputation in the community; false light protects one simply from emotional suffering. The interest in competition with defamation is the
right of public discussion. Thus, it makes some sense to adjust the
standard of fault required based on an individual's involvement with
the discussion. On the other hand, false light actions are in competition with the public's right to know. A newsworthy or public interest
test is appropriate because the status of the individual involved in
an event makes no difference in whether the public is legitimately
interested in it.
Moreover, because false light protects a less significant interest
than defamation, i.e. "hurt feelings," constitutional considerations
mandate that false light speech be given the protection of an actual
malice standard. This standard is particularly appropriate because
of the unpredictable nature of a false light action. It is practically
impossible to determine when someone will be offended by a publication, because there is no requirement that false light speech be
defamatory. In fact, seemingly harmless statements, even complimentary ones, have spawned successful false light claims. A standard less than knowledge would certainly have a "chilling effect" on
the media as they attempted to exercise their right to free speech.
Alternatively, when the false light speech is arguably defamatory, as
here, there is no compelling reason to allow a false light claim at all.
Respondent should not be allowed to sneak in the back door of defamation. He is certainly entitled to choose the easily proven false
light claim. But he should not also be allowed to take advantage of
reduced standards of fault for private plaintiffs in defamation actions, standards developed by courts aware of the plaintiff's difficult
task in proving defamation.
Although actual malice is the appropriate standard for false
light, at the very least Respondent must show that Shoreline acted
negligently in publishing the erroneous statement. Negligence is the
minimum standard imposed for defamatory speech and there is no
valid reason to accord false light speech less protection. Even if negligence is the standard applied to this case, Respondent's claim must
fail. It is undisputed that Shoreline had no knowledge of the statement's existence or falsity. Moreover, Shoreline took affirmative
steps to prevent this type of occurrence from occurring.
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If Respondent is required to show merely negligence, he must
do so without the benefit of res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa is a convenient evidentiary tool to allocate liability when only monetary damages are at stake, but it is inappropriate when first amendment freedoms are at issue. Res ipsa allows an inference that negligence is
"more likely than not" the cause of an injury. But greater certainty
than mere probability must accompany infringement on free speech.
Moreover, res ipsa shifts to the defendant the burden of proving
that no negligence occurred. This evidentiary shift is clearly in variance with this Court's insistence that the plaintiff shoulder the burden of proving falsity, fault, and harm in order to protect speech.
Finally, even if res ipsa is appropriate in a constitutional setting, Respondent has failed to establish that the doctrine should be
applied here. He cannot show that this injury is of the kind that
would not occur without negligence, nor can he prove that the computer system was in Shoreline's exclusive control. Accordingly, res
ipsa is unavailable to him.
ARGUMENT

I
THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES THAT To RECOVER FOR FALSE
LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY, RESPONDENT MUST PROVE THAT

SHORELINE ACTED WITH ACTUAL MALICE IN PUBLISHING THE
ERRONEOUS STATEMENT.

Respondent chose to sue Shoreline Press only for false light invasion of privacy. According to the common law of Marshall, Respondent must show merely that Shoreline published a falsehood
about Stark that placed him before the public in a false light
"highly offensive to a reasonable person" (R. 4.). By suing in false
light, Respondent is attempting to avoid the more rigorous requirements of a defamation action, yet take advantage of its reduced
standard of fault available to private figure plaintiffs. However, because first amendment considerations outweigh the interest in protecting hurt feelings, Stark should have to shoulder the burden of
proving that Shoreline acted with actual malice.
A.

THIS COURT'S DECISION IN

Time, Inc. v. Hill REQUIRES

THAT AC-

TUAL MALICE BE PROVEN IN FALSE LIGHT CASES.

Unlike defamation, where the injury is to one's reputation in
the community, false light seeks recovery for emotional bruises.
Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1984);
see also Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press,
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14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329 (1979). To prove his false light claim,
Respondent must show that an untrue statement was publicized
about him. Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188
Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982). And he must show merely that a
reasonable person would be upset by the falsehood. Spahn v. Julian
Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1966).
In the instant case, Respondent was simply upset by the mistaken and unintentional mention of him in an article published by
Shoreline. He does not contend that his reputation suffered in any
way. But because the constitutional guarantee of free speech so
greatly outweighs Respondent's fleeting annoyance, Shoreline should
be entitled to the utmost constitutional protection, especially given
the circumstances of this case.
1. Actual malice is the standard for all false light claims.
This Court has applied an actual malice standard in the only
two false light cases to come before it. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967). Both cases govern Respondent's claim and require a showing
of actual malice, i.e., knowing or reckless falsehood. This Respondent failed to do.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, involved a Life Magazine story about the
opening of a new play, "The Desperate Hours." The magazine characterized the play as a reenactment of a highly publicized incident
which had occurred some years before and in which the Hill family
had been held hostage in their home by three escaped convicts. Unlike the Hill experience, however, the play depicted the convicts as
being violent and as subjecting the daughter to a "verbal sexual insult." 385 U.S. at 378. The Hills, who had moved to another state
and had discouraged publicity, sued the magazine and recovered
damages under a New York statute prohibiting the appropriation of
another's name or picture without the individual's consent. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the first amendment prohibited
recovery absent proof that the report was published with actual malice. Id. at 388. Although the Court did not address the standard of
fault in Cantrell, knowing falsehood was clearly present. 419 U.S. at
250.
As Justice Brennan explained for the Court in Hill: "[e]xposure
of the self to others" is a risk that is "an essential incident of life in
a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of
press." 385 U.S. at 388. Punishment of innocent or careless errors
could discourage the press from "exercising the constitutional guarantees." Id. at 389.
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In requiring actual malice for a false light claim, the Court applied a standard first developed in the context of defamatory speech.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court denounced the common law's strict liability for injurious falsehood.
The Court concluded that "erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . .to survive.'"
Id. at 271-72 (citations omitted). Further, the defense of truth was
seen as inadequate to protect "robust and wide-open" debate on
public issues. Rather, the Court found that requiring the defendant
to prove the truth of all statements or suffer a libel judgment would
lead to unacceptable media "self-censorship." Protected speech
would be deterred as the media would "make only statements which
'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' "Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
As the Court continued to protect free speech values, the actual
malice standard was extended to public figures in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion) (Harlan, J.),
and, briefly, to matters of public concern, regardless of the plaintiff's
status, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.). Still dealing with defamatory speech,
the Court narrowly defined reckless disregard to mean "serious
doubts" as to the truth of the published matter. St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). The Court declared that
"neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care
would protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amendment policies." Id. at 731-32. Thus, in order to
make sure that truth does emerge, "it is essential that the First
Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true
ones." Id.
In recent years, this Court had modified its implicit presumption that actual malice is the necessary standard of fault only in situations peculiar to defamation, and without departing from the fundamental principle that the first amendment demands strong
protection even for defamatory speech. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court found that private defamation
plaintiffs need show mere fault, not actual malice, to recover. Similarly, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2939 (1985) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (White, J., concurring), five members of the Court agreed that
a private individual's reputational interest outweighed the constitutional considerations when the speech involved a matter of purely
private concern. But again, the Court was willing only to say that
the constitutional value of speech involving a private plaintiff and
private concern was "reduced," not nonexistent. Id. at 2946 (plural-
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ity opinion) (Powell, J.).
An exception to the actual malice standard for private plaintiffs
is justifiable in defamation, although not false light, because of the
different interest that defamation seeks to protect. Defamation protects one from injury to reputation; false light protects one from
wounded sensibilities. Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wash. 2d 253, 258, 396
P.2d 793, 796 (1964). As defamation is in conflict with the right of
public discussion, it makes some sense to adjust the necessary standard of fault as the individual becomes more involved in this discussion. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. But because false light protects one
from prying eyes, the right to privacy must yield when the matter is
one of legitimate public interest. The status of the individual makes
no difference when the conflict is between privacy and the public's
right to know.
Actual malice has been applied consistently as the proper standard of fault in false light cases involving private plaintiffs. Dodrill
v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980) (actual malice required of private
plaintiff challenging erroneous report that he had failed the bar examination); McCall v. Courier-Journaland Louisville Times Co.,
623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982) (the
Kentucky high court applied actual malice standard to a private figure's claim that story implying criminal conduct placed him in false
light); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188
Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982) (actual malice the appropriate standard in private figure's claim that disclosure of financial affairs cast
him in false light); Dean v. Guard Publishing Co., 73 Or. App. 656,
699 P.2d 1158 (1985) (actual malice standard applicable to claim
that photograph of private plaintiff at an alcohol rehabilitation
center placed him in false light).
In this case, Shoreline Press had no knowledge that the statement was even in the "Law News" column, much less that it was
false. Nor is there an indication that the newspaper had any knowledge that the computer system could be breached. Even if the newspaper had intentionally published that Stark filed for bankruptcy,
Hill would require a showing that Shoreline knew of its falsity or
had serious doubts as to its truth. Here, Shoreline simply had no
knowledge of the statement at all. Rather, Shoreline took affirmative steps to prevent what happened here from ever occurring. It is
undisputed that neither the reporter nor the editor saw the reference to Respondent until it appeared in the distributed newspaper,
even though the article was reviewed several times before publication (R.3). Because technology is yet at a stage that a computer system is not "hacker-proof," see infra pp. 27-37, a standard less than
knowledge would require "such meticulous care as would induce un-
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due self-censorship by the news media." Cefalu v.Globe Newspaper
Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 77, 391 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980).
Even more chilling, the self censorship that would result from
imposition of liability in this case would not be merely restraint
from printing what is difficult to prove, but from printing anything
at all. Shoreline may be forced to do without its computer or be
punished by large verdicts in damage suits it cannot prevent. Moreover, other publishers, also using similar equipment would be fair
game for those seeking easy money. They, too, would be forced to
choose between their free speech rights and safety from crushing
damage awards. Surely, imposition of liability against Shoreline on
these facts will pose a "grave hazard" that the press will be discouraged from "exercising the constitutional guarantees." Hill, 385 U.S.
at 389.
1. Time, Inc. v. Hill requires actual malice at least when the
speech is of public interest.
Even if Shoreline had intentionally published the erroneous
statement, Respondent would be required to prove actual malice because the statement, while not a matter of public concern, is of public interest. Here, while a report that Respondent filed for bankruptcy is not a public concern, it is of legitimate public interest. The
business community, creditors and clients have a right to know if
Stark filed for personal bankruptcy. Shoreline could have deliberately published the statement, and would be subject to liability only
if it knew that the report was inaccurate.
In Hill, this Court found that there was "no doubt" that the
opening of a new play based on an actual incident was of public
interest. 385 U.S. at 388. Similarly, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.) the Court
recognized that the community had "vital" interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws. Id. at 43. Although never defining the test,
this Court has noted the existence of public interest in a supposed
conspiracy to fix a football game, Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); in a career Army officer's opposition to the integration of the University of Mississippi, Associated Press v. Walker,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); and in a human cannonball's performance,
Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
The Court has consistently been concerned with protecting free expression when it involves issues of public interest. Garrison v.Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (uninhibited debate on "public issues"
requires punishing only the "knowing or reckless falsehood); Rosenblatt v.Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) ("a strong interest in debate on
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public issues"); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)) (freedom of expression necessary for "all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period"); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134
(1967) (plurality opinion) (Harlan, J.) (public has a "justified and
important interest" in certain issues); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (matters of "local governmental interest and importance" of "particular First
Amendment concern"); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 43 (1971) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.) (when matter is of
"general or public interest" the actual malice standard is required)
(modified by Gertz); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2945 (1985) (noting that speech on "matters of
public concern" at the core of speech the First Amendment protects); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558,
1564 (1986) (true speech on "matters of public concern" must not be
deterred).
Public interest in the false light sense is distinguishable from
public concern as it is used in connection with defamation. A public
concern is more aptly defined as a "controversy" which is capable of
resolution. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. The concept is used solely to determine whether a plaintiff has given up some degree of protection
for his reputation because he has "thrust" himself into a public controversy to "influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. A
matter may be of public interest, yet not of public concern. Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (divorce of wealthy couple
not a "public controversy" although possibly "of interest").
It is especially appropriate for this Court to adopt a public interest test for false light cases, notwithstanding the maintenance of
the public figure/public controversy distinction in defamation law.
Defamation puts an individual's right to protect his reputation
against the right of public discussion; a standard that changes as the
individual's assumption of risk changes protects both interests. An
individual who becomes involved in a public controversy has "invited attention and comment" and has less basis for complaint when
some of those comments are harmful to his reputation. See Gertz,
418 U.S. at 345. False light, however, seeks to protect one's right to
be "let alone." Cooley, The Law of Torts 29 (1888). The competing
interest, unlike defamation, is the public's right to know. Here, the
right to be "let alone" must yield to a matter of legitimate public
interest. McCall, 623 S.W.2d at 887; Berry v. National Broadcasting
Co., 480 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 418 U.S. 911
(1974) (killing a person is subject of public interest hence, plaintiff
in false light claim must show actual malice); Cantrell v. American
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Broadcasting Co., 529 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("right of
privacy is a limited one in areas of legitimate public interest"). Even
Louis Brandeis and his then law partner, Samuel Warren, who are
generally credited with creating the right to privacy, conceded that
it "does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or
general interest." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.
L. Rev. 193, 214 (1890). Thus, it makes sense to apply a "public
interest" or a newsworthy test when a false light claim is being
pursued.
The Court in Hill applied such a logical test. While the district
court erroneously identified plaintiff Hill as a public figure, (R. 4)
his status was irrelevant to the Court. Rather, the Court was concerned with the subject matter of the speech at issue, which was
clearly not a public controversy or concern as defined by Gertz, yet
surely of public interest. Similarly, although Shoreline does not dispute that the bankruptcy statement was not a matter of public concern, it is at least of public interest. Public interest includes both
the dissemination of current events and any "informational material
of legitimate public interest." Buzinski v. DoAll Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d
191, 195, 175 N.E.2d 577, 579 (1961). Certainly, the business community is interested in knowing which of its customers have filed for
bankruptcy. And equally clearly, an attorney's clients would be
quite attentive to news that their counselor had gone into bankruptcy. If a standard other than knowledge is applied in false light,
a private person could recover based on a showing little more substantial than indifference to the plaintiff's feelings. The media could
be held liable for simply identifying a private person involved in a
newsworthy event, a result condemned by this Court in Hill as "present[ing] a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising
the constitutional guarantees." Hill, 385 U.S. at 389.

B.

BECAUSE RESPONDENT CAN PROVE FALSE LIGHT MORE EASILY
THAN DEFAMATION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREE
SPEECH ENTITLES SHORELINE To THE PROTECTION AFFORDED By

AN

ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD.

While false light and defamation both share the same requirement that the words published be false, there are a number of significant differences between the two legal theories. Put simply, false
light is easier to prove than defamation. Respondent may choose the
easier road. He may choose to recover for fleeting irritation. However, Respondent should not also be able to pick and choose the
standards developed by courts for plaintiffs faced with the more difficult task of defamation. As the seventh circuit noted recently,
"[a]n argument can be made that the injury that being cast in a
false light creates is less serious than that created by being defamed,
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and therefore the plaintiff should have a tougher row to hoe."
Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1141 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986). Respondent should be
required to hoe this tougher row.
Defamation actions protect the individual's interest in his reputation, while false light protects the individual's emotional suffering
resulting from being placed before the public in a manner other
than what he is. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70,
87 (W. Va. 1984) (invasion of privacy claims involve "injuries to
emotions and mental suffering"); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982) (false light
protects person from being portrayed before the public in false manner). Had he sued in defamation, Respondent would have to show
that the statement that he filed for bankruptcy was actually defamatory, that it held him up to "hatred," "contempt," or "scorn," Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186
N.E. 217, 218 (1933), or tended to "lower him in the estimation of
the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977). Respondent
also would be required to prove that either he or his reputation actually suffered. Gobin v. Globe PublishingCo., 232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d
1239 (1982); France v. St. Claire's Hospital & Health Center, 82
A.D.2d 1, 441 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981). By suing in false light, he need
merely show that a reasonable person might be embarrassed or offended by the falsehood. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.
324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966); Machleder v. Diaz,
538 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Moreover, an action in false light does not even require that the
statement be defamatory; indeed, it may be complimentary. False
light can arise from seemingly harmless utterances. For example, in
Spahn, a biographer of baseball pitcher Warren Spahn erroneously
described him as a war hero. Spahn was able to enjoin publication of
the book and recover money damages. See Zolich, Laudatory Invasion of Privacy, 16 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 532 (1967). Even the Court in
Gertz noted that considerations allowing a reduction of fault for a
private plaintiff would be substantially altered if a state chose to
impose liability on a misstatement "whose content did not warn a
reasonably prudent editor of its defamatory potential." 418 U.S. at
348.
Certainly it makes sense to require that a publisher know that a
matter is false or seriously doubt its truth to be liable for damages,
particularly when the matter would not on its face warn of its harmful nature. Any lesser standard of fault would place an "intolerable
burden" on the press to judge the reasonableness of its conduct.
Hill, 385 U.S. at 389. One would need to be clairvoyant to determine
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with any sort of reliability when a published matter, not on its face
harmful, would offend someone. The most innocuous circumstances
have given rise to successful false light claims. Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 987 (plaintiff distressed with characterization of his wife, who
had killed their three children, then herself, as "happiest mother in
the neighborhood"); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 252 (1985) (amusement park entertainer "very upset" when a men's magazine published a picture of
her act with "Ralph, the Diving Pig"); Nelson v. Globe International, 12 Med. L. Rptr. 1785 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (nutritionist "horrified and shocked" when she was linked with a marshmallow diet).
Certainly a standard less than knowledge would pose an "intolerable
burden" on the press because it would be forced to gauge the reasonableness of its conduct. This would be true especially in instances where the published matter previously seemed unlikely to
embarrass or offend.
Similarly, here, Shoreline had no forewarning of the harmful
nature of the "Law News" column as it appeared in print. The record indicates that Shoreline took affirmative steps to prevent such
an error from occurring (R. 2, 3). The computer system is protected
by a password system and the articles are reviewed repeatedly
before publication. A standard less than actual knowledge would
equate Shoreline's responsible practice of journalism with another
who, with poor judgment, prints a statement that a reasonable publisher would not have printed. In both cases, a jury guided by hindsight, could determine perhaps, that negligence occurred because the
reporter could have called one more person or the editor could have
checked the "Law News" column just one more time. Shoreline
would be punished, even though clearly exercising caution.
Further, a negligence standard is an "elusive" concept, incapable of precise and consistent application. Hill, 385 U.S. at 389. One
does not know if the standard to be applied will be what a "responsible publisher" would have done. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). Perhaps the court will apply the standard
of "ordinarily prudent persons engaged in the same kind of business." Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla.
1976). Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 3, 649 P.2d 1239
(1982) (reasonable publisher in the community or "similar communities"). It is unclear whether if an industry standard is to be applied, Shoreline would be held to the same standard of care as the
New York Times or the Washington Post. If the standard adopted
is that of an "ordinarily prudent person," Memphis Publishing Co.
v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978), jurors will then be asked to
determine, based on their own personal experience, whether particu-
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lar conduct was reasonable, even when the publisher had no warning
of the potential harm of the publication.
A negligence standard, which cannot be predicted or applied
with any reliability, coupled with the general unpredictability of a
false light claim, is tantamount to no standard at all. A negligence
standard will give juries carte blanche to punish unpopular speakers.
Rather, a negligence standard is really just a cloak for imposition of
strict liability for publication of false matter, clearly repugnant to
the first amendment and squarely denounced by this Court. Erroneous statement is inevitable in "robust and wide-open" debate, and
even falsehood must be protected "if the freedoms of expression are
to have the 'breathing space' they need

. . .

to survive." New York

Times, 376 U.S. at 270-72 (citations omitted). Because negligence is
essentially no standard at all, Shoreline's affirmative steps at responsible journalism would yield no greater reward than for one who
can make his malevolent intent appear merely negligent.
Moreover, when the statement at issue is at least arguably defamatory, as here, there is no valid reason to allow a false light claim
at all. As Dean Prosser warned, false light may be capable of "swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public defamation." Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 401 (1960). Prosser noted that
limitations on defamation were established "in the interest of freedom of the press" and to "discourag[e] . . . trivial and extortionate

claims," and questioned whether such restrictions could be "circumvented in so casual and cavalier a fashion." Id.
Refusal to authorize false light as an easy alternative to defamation evinces a proper sensitivity to the tension between the first
amendment and libel and slander claims, because "[w]hatever is
added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate."
Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 547, 548 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 678 (1942). North Carolina courts, for example, have held
that false light will not be recognized as a cause of action in that
state. In Renwick v. News and Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C.
312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1985), the
court noted that false light often duplicates an existing claim under
libel or slander, and most importantly, that recognition of a second
tort which permits recovery beyond the boundaries of defamation
would "add to the tension already existing between the First
Amendment and the law of torts." Id. 310 N.C. at 323, 312 S.E.2d at
412. Similarly, Virginia courts also condemn a false light cause of
action. Falwell v. Penthouse International,Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204
(W.D. Va. 1981).
The Missouri Supreme Court recently rejected a false light
claim, characterizing it as a defamation action in disguise. The
plaintiff, a former city hospital administrator who contended that
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five-year-old television broadcasts had falsely conveyed the impression that he was building his home with materials stolen from the
city, was attempting to avoid an expired statute of limitations for
defamation actions. Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting, 12 Med. L.
Rptr. 2187 (Mo. 1986). Quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
652 (1977), the court stated:
[L]imitations of long standing that have been found desirable for the
action for defamation should not be successfully evaded by proceeding
upon a different theory of later origin, in the development of which
the attention of the courts has not been directed to the limitation.
(Comment e, at 399.)
Sullivan, 12 Med. L. Rptr. at 2191. By statute, Wisconsin recognizes
all invasion of privacy actions except false light. Wis. Stat. Ann. §
895.50 (West 1983). Nebraska, which by statute allows a false light
claim, requires that actual malice be proven. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20204 (1983).
Respondent should not be able to sneak in the back door of
defamation. Instead of showing that he was actually injured in some
way by the inadvertent publication, Respondent wants to recover for
his momentary irritation. Moreover, he wants to recover without at
least showing that Shoreline even knew of the statement's existence,
much less its falsity. This will not merely have a chilling effect on
Shoreline; it may effectively preclude Shoreline from "exercising its
constitutional guarantees" altogether. And not only will Shoreline be
affected; publishers nationwide may be forced to close down, faced
with the spectre of unpreventable damage awards.
II.
IF FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES ARE To BE PRESERVED,
RESPONDENT MUST AT LEAST PROVE THAT SHORELINE PRESS WAS
NEGLIGENT WHEN IT PUBLISHED THE ERRONEOUS STATEMENT.

This Court has never sustained a defamation or false light claim
in the absence of fault. It should not do so now. While Shoreline
maintains that actual malice is the appropriate standard, at the very
least, this Court should uphold the circuit court's ruling that negligence must be shown before Respondent may recover in a false light
claim.
A.

THE MINIMUM STANDARD FOR DEFAMATION Is NEGLIGENCE.

In Gertz, this Court plainly stated: "We hold that, so long as
they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individ-
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ual." 418 U.S. at 347. Further, this Court recognized that a rule of
strict liability "that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee
the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable selfcensorship." Id. at 340. This Court demands, and has always demanded, that the balance between free speech and societal interest
in reputation requires a defamation plaintiff to add fault to the
scales in order to tip them in his favor.
Further, Gertz is applicable to a private figure plaintiff challenging speech of a private nature. In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court
only restricted the application of Gertz as it dealt with presumptive
and punitive damages. See Dun & Bradstreet, 143 Vt. 66, 46 A.2d
413 (1983) (Vermont Supreme Court held that plaintiff had established negligence). Private plaintiffs suing over private matters need
not show actual malice to recover punitive and presumed damages.
But they must, under Gertz, show fault.
The Court is not returning to the days of strict liability at the
expense of our most fundamental freedom, as evidenced by one of
its most recent decisions involving defamation. In determining
which party should bear the burden of proving falsity, this Court
again gave great weight to first amendment protection of speech.
"[Wihere the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe
that the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting
speech," Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 106 S. Ct. at 1564. Even
though such a ruling would undoubtedly preclude some libeled
plaintiffs from recovering, this Court believed that protecting speech
"that matters" mandated such a result. Id. at 1565.
B.

FALSE LIGHT DESERVES AT LEAST THE MINIMAL STANDARD OF
NEGLIGENCE THAT Is ACCORDED DEFAMATION.

While Shoreline Press maintains that false light speech deserves
considerably more constitutional protection than defamatory
speech, there certainly is no good reason for according it less. Both
actions deal with published falsehood and resulting injury. Courts
not providing false light greater protection have at least found it
entitled to the same protection as defamation. Rinsley v.Brandt,
446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th
Cir. 1984).
The minimum standard imposed has been negligence. In
Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981), the
court found that Gertz applied to the false light claim of a private
figure suing over his depiction in a book about his brother's murder
of their parents. The court held that negligence was the appropriate
standard, requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant "knew
or should have known" that the material was false. In Crump v.
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Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1984), the plaintiff was
a woman coal miner whose picture had been used to illustrate a
story about harassment in the mines. Concluding that Gertz controlled, the court found that the appropriate standard of fault was
what the "reasonably prudent person would have done under the
same or similar circumstances." Id. at 89. In Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783
(1985), the court, determining that Texas courts would apply a negligence standard in the case of a private figure plaintiff suing over
the unauthorized publication of nude photographs of her, stated the
standard as what a "reasonably prudent editor or publisher" would
do.
Even if a false light defendant is entitled merely to the same
protection as that accorded to defamation defendants, Respondent's
claim here cannot stand. Whether the standard is "knew or should
have known" or "reasonably prudent editor" or "reasonable person,"
Respondent has not established even negligence with "clear and
convincing" proof. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W.
4755 (U.S. June 25, 1986). Moreover, he cannot.
First, assuming that he could show that Shoreline knew the
statement was to be published, Respondent would have to show that
a "reasonable" editor or person would not have printed the statement. But it is uncontroverted that neither the reporter nor any of
the editors saw the statement until it appeared in the printed newspaper (R. 3). Shoreline uses state-of-the-art equipment; access to
the computer is protected by an intricate password system. However, as the parties concede, it is possible that a skilled "hacker"
could have penetrated the system from the outside (R. 3). Although
great care is taken, technology is such that a breach cannot be prevented. See infra, pp. 27-37. A negligence standard will at least safeguard publishers who take all prudent precautions. A strict liability
standard, on the other hand, portends grave consequences for the
future free flow of information. It is possible that the fear of such
judgments, which cannot be guarded against, would force newspapers to cease using computers to publish, or even cease publishing
altogether. This cessation, brought on by unpreventable damage
awards, would impermissibly burden the free flow of information.
The press would be afraid to exercise its constitutional guarantees
because it could not afford to compensate all those whose feelings
may be hurt by the antics of computer joy riders.
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III
THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S REQUIREMENT THAT RESPONDENT PROVE
FAULT IN His FALSE LIGHT CLAIM CANNOT BE SATISFIED By
RES IPSA LOQUITUR.

Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary shortcut developed to ease
plaintiffs' burden of proof in a limited class of civil cases. See Byrne
v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863). The doctrine entitles a
plaintiff to either an inference, Palleson v. Jewell Cooperative Elevator, 219 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 1974) or a presumption, Weiss v. Axler,
137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958), of negligence merely upon a showing that a particular type of accident occurred. It is a useful doctrine
to allocate liability when simple monetary damages are at issue, and
is adopted in some form by nearly every state and the District of
Columbia. (See Appendix E for a survey of res ipsa's use in the
United States.)
However, application of res ipsa is inappropriate when restraint
on first amendment freedoms is at stake. Permitting Respondent to
recover in this case, based on little more than a showing that an
erroneous statement appeared in the newspaper, clearly illustrates
the dangers that application of res ipsa loquitur to false light claims
poses to first amendment freedoms.
A.

APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR To A FALSE LIGHT CLAIM
IMPERMISSIBLY CONFLICTS WITH FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES.

The three conditions generally recognized for application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine are: (a) an accident of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone was negligent, Newing v.
Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 356, 540 P.2d 33, 124 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975);
(2) exclusive control by the defendant of the "instrumentality" causing the injury, Palleson,219 N.W.2d at 13; and (3) evidence tending
to exclude the plaintiff and third persons from responsibility for the
injury, Branco Eastern Co. v. Leffler, 173 Colo. 428, 482 P.2d 364
(1971).
Use of res ipsa has been limited primarily to instances of physical injury when policy considerations favor compensating the plaintiff if negligence is simply more likely to have been the cause of the
accident. Lynden Transport,Inc. v. Haragan,623 P.2d 789 (Alaska
1981) (trailer collapse causing personal injury "more probably than
not" caused by negligent maintenance); Palleson, 219 N.W.2d at 13
(presence of elm leaf in gas line causing explosion "could well be"
result of negligent installers); Newing, 15 Cal. 3d at 361, 540 P.2d at
40, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 200 ("reasonably clear" that an airplane does
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not crash in the absence of negligence).
However, a "more likely than not" test is at variance with this
Court's insistence that only the most compelling circumstances may
lead to infringement on first amendment freedoms. The Founding
Fathers "gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its
essential role in our democracy." New York Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (per curiam) (Black, J. concurring) (vacating an injunction against the Times for publication of a classified
study of the Vietnam war). The press is protected to "bare the
secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government." Id.
The Court must be "eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression" of unpopular opinions. Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "'[n]o
government ought to be without censors: and where the press is free
no one ever will.'" Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1950)
(quoting Thomas Jefferson). Here, Respondent seeks to impose liability on nothing more than a chance that Shoreline could have prevented the publication. Surely, the first amendment mandates more
precision than this.
Further, once res ipsa has been used to raise an inference or a
presumption of negligence, the burden of showing that the injury
was not the result of negligence shifts to the defendant, even if the
defendant is in no better position to explain the occurrence. J. &
Jay, Inc. v. E. Perry Iron & Metal Co., 161 Me. 229, 210 A.2d 462,
464 (1965) (doctrine shifts the "burden of evidence" to the defendant "who knows or should know"). The inference of negligence has
been allowed even when the defendant presents evidence of due
care. Bustamante v. Carborundum Co., 375 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir.
1967) (jury to determine whether inference of negligence is to "prevail over a defendant's countervailing proof of due care"). And,
alarmingly, the doctrine has been used to impose liability even when
the jury believed there had been no wrongdoing. Reilly v. Straub,
282 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1979) (jury finding that defendant doctor was
not guilty of negligence or "any wrongdoing," but was a "victim of
circumstances (res ipsa loquitor [sic])").
Such a shift in the evidentiary burden is incompatible with this
Court's insistence that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing
fault, falsity, and damage. PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). The Court has recognized that requiring
plaintiffs to prove their claims will result in no recovery for some
meritorious, yet undemonstrable, claims. Id. 106 S. Ct. at 1564. Conversely, requiring the defendant to prove absence of fault, truth and
harmlessness will result in some judgments of liability in undeserving cases. In striking a balance, this Court Found most recently in
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Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., that "the Constitution requires us
to tip [the scales] in favor of protecting true speech." Id.
In this case, it is uncontroverted that neither party knows who
placed the erroneous statement about Respondent in the newspaper
(R. 6). Yet, application of res ipsa loquitur would force Shoreline,
ignorant of the precise circumstances, to try to prove that it could
not have been prevented. Shoreline is placed in the untenable position of attempting to prove a negative: i.e., the absence of negligence. Failure by Shoreline to establish its non-negligence would result in a judgment of liability, even though the plaintiff has not
established at a minimum that Shoreline was to blame. Surely this
is an "imposi[tion] of liability without fault." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
Imposition of liability on Shoreline on these facts will pose a
"grave hazard" that the press will be discouraged from "exercising
the constitutional guarantees." Hill, 385 U.S. at 389. Protected
speech will be deterred because the other newspapers, which use
similar computer equipment (R. 3). will "fear large verdicts" in
damage suits from errors that they cannot prevent. Publishers may
shut down or seriously curtail their computer use, "steer[ing] far
wider of the unlawful zone." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 526.
The danger to constitutional freedoms is further exacerbated if
a plaintiff is able to obtain summary judgment while also taking advantage of res ipsa loquitur, as the district court improperly permitted Respondent to do. Federal rule of civil procedure 56(e) provides
that a party adverse to a motion for summary judgment must show
that there is a "genuine" issue of fact for trial. But, as in this case,
res ipsa is applied often to situations when the facts are at best unclear and at worst nonexistent. Summary judgment forces a defendant like Shoreline to prove the unprovable or lose its day in court.
Certainly this is not the sort of "clear and convincing" proof required by this Court. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W.
4755, (U.S. June 25, 1986).
B.

Is PERMISSIBLE WHEN FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES ARE AT STAKE, IT WAS INCORRECTLY APPLIED
EVEN IF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
IN THIS CASE.

Assuming arguendo that res ipsa loquitur is permissible in a
constitutional context, Respondent has failed to establish that he is
entitled to use of the doctrine.

1.

AN OUTSIDE "HACKER" COULD HAVE PENETRATED THE SYSTEM OR AN
EMPLOYEE COULD HAVE INSERTED THE ERRONEOUS STATEMENT EVEN
THOUGH SHORELINE EXERCISED REASONABLE CARE TO PREVENT SUCH
AN OCCURRENCE.
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Computer technology is such that no system is "failsafe" and
even the most secure system can be breached. See Smith, Who Is
Calling Your Computer Next? Hacker!, 8 Crim. Just. J. 89, 110
(1985). Respondent cannot take advantage of res ipsa loquitur without showing that the incident is one that generally does not occur
unless there has been negligence. Because the statement could have
been placed in the computer system regardless of the care exercised
by Shoreline, res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable to Respondent's claim.
In case after case, the courts have required that the plaintiff at least
show that the accident would not have occurred absent someone's
negligence. In Eaves v. City of Ottumwa, 240 Iowa 596, 38 N.W.2d
761 (1949), the Iowa Supreme Court refused application of res ipsa
loquitur to a complaint for property damage allegedly caused by
negligent delay in opening flood gates. The court found that a river
may overflow its banks and flood surrounding areas "without lack of
care by any human agency." Id. 240 Iowa at 970, 38 N.W.2d at 679.
Similarly, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply,
Inc., 359 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1978), the court rejected res ipsa's use by
plaintiffs injured when tires blew out on the motor vehicle in which
they were riding. The court noted that the plaintiffs must first show
that "in the light of past experience, negligence is the probable
cause and the defendant is the probable actor." Id. at 1342 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419
(Wyo. 1976), the court found that sewer lines could become plugged
and cause damage "even though due care [was] exercised" in their
design and construction, and that therefore, res ipsa loquitur was
unavailable to plaintiffs in their claim for property damage. Id. at
423 (emphasis in original). Additionally, in Hakensen v. Ennis, 584
P.2d 1138 (Alaska 1978), res ipsa loquitur was unavailable to a
plaintiff suing for wrongful death of her two children, who were passengers in a car which, along with the other occupants, disappeared.
The court found that res ipsa was inappropriate because it could not
be said that negligence was the more likely cause of their disappearance and presumed death. Because the "balance of probabilities between (1) causes of an accident involving the automobile which are
due to lack of care on the part of the driver, and (2) criminal activity, or causes of an accident not due to lack of reasonable care, are
so equal," an inference of negligence would be no more than "mere
speculation." Id. at 1139. It is well-settled that an inference of negligence cannot be raised unless an accident would ordinarily not occur
in its absence. Tedrow v. Des Moines Housing Co., 249 Iowa 766, 87
N.W.2d 466 (1958) (res ipsa not applicable when unclear whether a
short circuit in penny-laden fuse box caused fire). Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 88 P.2d 695 (1939), overruled on other grounds,
Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337
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(1962) (res ipsa not applied when physician performing corrective
surgery severed a nerve).
Respondent has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the
statement's publication was more likely the result of Shoreline's
negligence. The mere fact that the statement appeared is insufficient. Strick v. Stutsman, 633 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
("no presumption of liability will be drawn from the fact of an accident"). In fact, the evidence in the record supports the opposite inference that Shoreline exercised due care. The equipment used by
Shoreline is "state-of-the-art" (R. 2). Reporters and editor must
enter personal passwords to gain access to the computer files. Moreover, the articles are reviewed thoroughly before publication. Nevertheless, even the most sophisticated systems are capable of being
compromised. See Poore & Brockman, Barring Unauthorized Access: The Threats to Computer Security, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 14, 1985, at
14, col. 1 (1984 survey by Data Processing Management Association
found that 35 % of its members had been the victims of unauthorized use of their computer systems.) While improvements in computer technology may one day lead to the conclusion that access by
outside sources would not occur unless someone were negligent, that
is not the "common experience" today. Thus, the district court
wrongly concluded that Respondent was entitled to the res ipsa
inference.
2.

The computer is not within Shoreline's exclusive control.

A computer system cannot be "exclusively controlled" in the
same manner that an airplane, gas heater, or surgical scalpel can be
controlled. Physical possession of the computer machinery cannot,
because of technology, be equated with actual control of its use. Inside and outside hackers have gained access to computer systems of
GTE and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Smith,
Who is Calling Your Computer Next? Hacker!, 8 Crim. Just. J. 89
(1985), and nearly every sector of American business. Poore &
Brockman, Barring Unauthorized Access: The Threats to Computer Security, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 14, 1985, at 14, col. 1. Where plaintiffs have been unable to demonstrate that the "instrumentality" of
their injury was not under the "exclusive control" of the defendant,
they have been denied res ipsa's use. Terrell v. First National Bank
& Trust Co., 204 Okla. 24, 226 P.2d 431 (1960) (res ipsa loquitur not
available to a bank customer injured by the collapse of a revolving
door as she exited because the bank had no control over the door at
the time of the injury); Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 A.
720 (1932) (store customer injured when she sat on a chair that collapsed denied res ipsa loquitur because the chair was in her "exclusive control," not the store's).
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Similarly, a computer system accessible by outsiders with a
minimal amount of technical skill is not subject to the kind of exclusive control required for the use of res ipsa loquitur. Courts have
refused to apply res ipsa when there are potentially multiple persons
or causes of an injury, and the plaintiff has failed to exclude those
not under the defendant's control. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v.
Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 62 P.2d 1297 (1936). While it is possible that one
of Shoreline's employees inserted the sentence into the column-although arguably such a deliberate action would be outside
the scope of his employment and thus, free Shoreline of liability,
Skapura v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 89 Ohio App. 403, 100
N.E.2d 700 (1950)-plaintiff has not excluded the very real likelihood that an outside source beyond Shoreline's control is responsible. Respondent is therefore precluded from using res ipsa under the
doctrine's second component.
3.

Shoreline has no "superior knowledge" as to how the insert
occurred.

An underlying rationale of res ipsa loquitur is that plaintiff
should not be forced to prove how an accident occurred when the
defendant is more "favorably situated" and has "superior knowledge" of its cause. Shutt v. Kaufman's, Inc., 165 Colo. 175, 438 P.2d
501 (1968). Res ipsa forces the defendant to provide an explanation
or be held liable. But if the circumstances are such that they do not
suggest such knowledge, or "if the plaintiff himself has equal or superior means of information," res ipsa is inapplicable. Id. at 503.
Neither Shoreline nor Respondent knows who placed the reference to Respondent in the newspaper. Neither party has superior
knowledge of the incident. To hold Shoreline responsible here would
"invoke the doctrine to an unreasonable, impractical nd unrealistic
degree, where mere injury could dispense with plaintiffs burden of
proving a defendant's negligence, even where it would be impossible
for defendant to show freedom therefrom." Matievitch v. Hercules
Powder Co., 3 Utah 2d 283, 285, 282 P.2d 1044, 1045 (1955) (res ipsa
not applicable to personal injury claim resulting from a dynamite
explosion where there was no evidence as to how dynamite was manufactured or handled prior to its use by the plaintiff). Thus, res ipsa
loquitur does not apply.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests this
Court to hold that, before Respondent can recover on his false light
claim, he must prove: (1) that Shoreline acted with actual malice
when it published the erroneous statement; or, alternatively, (2) at
least, that Shoreline acted negligently. Additionally, Petitioner requests this Court to find that res ipsa loquitur may not be used to
establish the constitutionally required fault.

Respectfully submitted

Counsel for Petitioner
(Names omitted pursuant to Benton rules III (G))
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APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARSHALL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Bradley Stark, moved for summary judgment, pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. Rule 56, in this cause for invasion of privacy
sounding in false light. This court finds that no genuine issue as to
any material facts exists and that the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment on the issue of liability alone.
FACTS
This false light action arises from a news item appearing in defendant's newspaper which said that plaintiff had filed for personal
bankruptcy. Plaintiff is an attorney licensed and practicing in the
State of Marshall. Defendant publishes a daily newspaper in the
State of Lincoln, where defendant maintains its corporate offices
and principal place of business. Copies of newspapers containing the
article in question were distributed in the abutting State of Marshall. Plaintiff brought the action based upon diversity jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), because the parties are citizens of different
states and plaintiff's claimed damages exceed $10,000. Defendant
did not object to venue in the District of Marshall, nor does it disagree that the common law of the State of Marshall applies in this
cause. The parties have stipulated to the following facts.
On Monday, May 14, 1984, defendant published its weekly column on developments in the legal community. At the bottom of the
column appeared the following:
Personal injury lawyer Bradley Start, with business in the doldrums,
filed bankruptcy last week.
On Tuesday, May 22, 1984, Stark filed this false light action against
the defendant. Plaintiff's complaint alleged merely that defendant
publicized an untruthful statement which placed him in false light
in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person, and he asked
for punitive and compensatory damages. This court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to allege deliberate
or reckless falsity.
Amy Curtin, a reporter for defendant, regularly prepares items
about new developments in the legal community for defendant's
weekly "Law News" column. On Wednesday, May 9, 1984, she
drafted an article for the "Law News" column using a personal com-
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puter in her home. Curtin's personal computer can be linked by telephone lines to the defendant's mainframe computer through use of a
modem. After entering her personal password, she transmitted the
article to defendant's mainframe computer for future processing.
Defendant's mainframe and electronic publishing program is similar
to state-of-the-art systems used by most others in the industry. Curtin maintains that her article as transmitted did not contain any
reference whatsoever to plaintiff, and no evidence to the contrary
was presented.
Douglas Adams, editor for the newspaper's business section,
where "Law News" appears, examined Curtin's article on Thursday,
May 10. He used the terminal on his desk having gained access to
the mainframe file by using his personal password. Adams edited
Curtin's article and says that at that time it contained no reference
to plaintiff. The next day, Adams electronically formatted all materials for the "Law News" column in preparation for printing and confirms there still was no reference in the article to plaintiff.
The business section for Monday's paper is usually, as on this
occasion, printed on Sunday afternoon for distribution early the
next morning. Michael Roper, defendant's director of printing, used
the computer terminal at his desk to load the formatted and edited
Monday's business section from the mainframe into the computer
which operates the printing presses.
The parties stipulate that there is no evidence of any computer
malfunction. It was also stipulated that one of defendant's employees could have inserted the offensive material without leaving any
identifying evidence. Alternatively, some skilled "hacker" could
have penetrated defendant's system from outside through telephone
lines.
Plaintiff has never filed for bankruptcy for himself or even represented anyone in a bankruptcy matter. Defendant does not dispute that the information about plaintiff appearing in the column
was false. Defendant admits that the "Law News" column never
before contained any information about an attorney filing for personal bankruptcy, nor does it assign reporters to check bankruptcy
filings at the federal courthouse.
Analysis
In the State of Marshall, the prima facie case for actions sounding in false light invasion of privacy requires that a plaintiff prove
that (1) defendant publicized (2) a matter concerning plaintiff (3)
placing that plaintiff before the public in a false light (4) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. The courts of Marshall
have not had occasion to consider the false light action since 1964,
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when the Supreme Court began to impose constitutional constraints
on torts involving speech. The case of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374 (1967), required a public figure plaintiff in a false light privacy
action to establish knowledge of falsity or recklessness as to truth or
falsity of the matter published. This case requires us now to decide
an issue left open in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S.
245, 250-51 (1974), namely,
whether a State may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of false statements injurious
to a private individual under a false-light thereby of invasion of privacy, or whether the constitutional standard announced in Time, Inc.
v. Hill, [385 U.S. 374 (1967)] applies to all false-light cases.
We hold that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), requirement of knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard
of the truth is not applicable to this false light action. The speech
involved here was about a private person and a matter not of public
interest. Where speech is about a private person, courts must look to
the content, form and context to determine whether it is a matter of
public concern. If it is not a matter of public concern, the Supreme
Court has already determined that a plaintiff does not have to prove
Sullivan malice to recover presumptive or punitive damages for injurious falsehoods. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (plurality). Further, we agree with Justice White who, writing separately, in Greenmoss said,
[a]lthough Justice POWELL speaks only of the inapplicability of the
Gertz rule with respect to presumed and punitive damages, it must be
that the Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the
defendant is also inapplicable in cases such as this.
105 S. Ct. 2953 (White, J.). Without a matter of public concern,
there is no reason to impose constitutional constraints on speech
giving rise to false light actions. Therefore, we are governed by the
common law of Marshall.
I find no requirement in the prima facie case for a false light
plaintiff to prove fault. In Marshall, common law defamation actions
sounded in strict liability. Although defamation and false light actions protect different interests, both provide redress for false
speech. Under Marshall common law, saying that someone is financially bankrupt is objectionable and offensive to a reasonable person. This false statement appeared in defendant's publication and
defendant is strictly liable for it. The mental state of its employees
is irrelevant.
The defendant argues here, however, that "so long as they do
not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (footnote omitted). I rule that Greenmoss frees tort actions involving matters not
of public concern from constitutional constraints. Even if plaintiff
were required to show some fault, in this situation negligence was
established as a matter of law. The harm occurred only because defendant failed to maintain a secure printing system. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur should, and does, apply to this situation. It is uncontroverted that no one knows who placed the offensive reference
to plaintiff in defendant's newspaper; however, but for defendant's
failure to maintain security of the printing system this falsehood
would not have been published. The system was, at all times, under
the control of defendant. Justice Brennan foresaw this possibility
when he said, "[tihe central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will
not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology."
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
This court further finds that this order granting summary judgment involves controlling questions of law as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from this order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.
It is ordered that judgment is entered for plaintiff against defendant on the question of liability and a trial shall be set up on the
question of damages alone.
Entered: /S/ Judge Simon Gordon
Dated: June 24, 1985
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT
Argued, November 18, 1985, decided December 6, 1985.
Before Morris, Bloom, and Holden, Circuit Judges.
Morris, Circuit Judge. This matter comes before this court on
an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). On June
24, 1985, District Judge Gordon entered summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff on the question of liability. On July 1, 1985, this
court entered an order noting jurisdiction and permitting this interlocutory appeal. We also ordered a stay in the proceedings below.
Having reviewed the record and briefs and heard argument, we
affirm in part and reverse in part and remand this matter for further
proceedings.
We agree that Sullivan malice, i.e., deliberate or reckless falsity,
need not be proved where a false light privacy case involves a private plaintiff and no matter of public concern. However, the court
below allowed liability without fault in complete disregard of the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974). The Court there unequivocally said that the Constitution requires a finding of fault before redress will be allowed for
the publication of injurious falsehoods. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (plurality) restricted the application of Gertz only to presumptive and punitive
damages. Otherwise, Gertz applies. Defendant newspaper does not
dispute that the injurious falsehood in this case involves a matter
not of public concern about a private person. However, a plaintiff
seeking recovery of damages in false light actions must at least
prove negligence.
The district court also improperly applied res ipsa loquitur to
find defendant negligent as a matter of law for failing to protect its
electronic printing system from unauthorized intrusion. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not satisfy the constitutional mandate
that plaintiff prove some fault. Finding no evidence in the stipulated
facts to support the negligence of defendant with convincing clarity,
we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further
proceedings.
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907

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the parties
are ordered to address the following issues:
1. Whether the Constitution requires that a private person prove
Sullivan malice to recover in a false light action where the injurious falsehood is not a matter of public concern?
2. If a private person in a false light action not involving a matter of
public concern need not prove deliberate falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, do constitutional constraints require that the
plaintiff prove fault?
3. If the plaintiff in a false light action by a private person not involving a matter of public concern must prove negligence, does the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur satisfy constitutional requirements of proof?
P.J. Flaherty
Clerk of the Court
June 30, 1986
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APPENDIX B
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution:
AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
APPENDIX C
SURVEY OF STATE RECOGNITION OF FALSE LIGHT
ALABAMA
Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So.
2d 474 (1964). Recognizes invasion of privacy generally.
ARIZONA
Pegler v. Sullivan, 6 Ariz. App. 338, 432 P.2d 593 (1969).
Recognizes invasion of privacy generally.
ARKANSAS
Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat, 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d
840 (1979), cert, denied, 44 U.S. 1076 (1980). Recognizes
false light.
CALIFORNIA
Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 549 P.2d 912, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 360 (1969). Recognizes false light.
CONNECTICUT
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188
Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982). Recognizes false light.
Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987, reh'g denied,
395 U.S. 930 (1969). Recognizes false light.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Dresbach v. Doubleday, 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981).
Recognizes false light.
FLORIDA
Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, 433 So. 2d 593 (Fla. App.
1983). Implies existence of false light.
GEORGIA
Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 SE.2d 496
(1966). Implies existence of false light.
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IDAHO
Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984
(1974). Recognizes false light.
ILLINOIS
Douglass v. Hustler, 796 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1489 (1986). Recognizes false light.
INDIANA
Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 499 F.2d 797 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974). Recognizes invasion of privacy generally.
IOWA
Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816 (Ia. 1977). Cites with
approval all four privacy torts.
KANSAS
Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 599 P.2d 334 (1977).
Recognizes false light.
KENTUCKY
McCall v. Courier Journal,623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980). Recognizes false light.
LOUISIANA
Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., 296 So.2d 543 (La. 1974).
Recognizes false light.
MAINE
Matheson v. Bangor Publishing, 414 A.2d 1203 (Me. Jud.
1980). Recognizes false light by implication.
MARYLAND
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse InternationalLtd., 525 F. Supp.
585 (D. Md. 1981). Recognizes false light.
MASSACHUSETTS
Braver v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass 53, 217 N.E.2d
736 (1966). Reserves question of whether invasion of privacy torts exist.
MISSISSIPPI
Wilson v. Retain Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Miss.
1971). Recognizes false light by implication.
NEBRASKA
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-204 (1983). Recognizes false light.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239
(1964). Recognizes invasion of privacy generally.
NEW JERSEY
Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380
(1977). Recognizes false light.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:872

NEW MEXICO
McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 88 N.M. 162,
538 P.2d 804, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248
(1975). Recognizes invasion of privacy generally.
NEVADA
Montesano v. Las Vegas Review Journal,99 Nev. 644, 688
P.2d 1081 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 959. Recognizes
invasion of privacy generally.
NORTH CAROLINA
Renwick v. News and Observer, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d
405 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1985). No recognition of false light.
OHIO
Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). Recognizes false light.
OKLAHOMA
McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing,613 P.2d 737 (Okla.
Sup. Ct. 1980). Recognizes false light.
OREGON
Martinez v. Democrat-Herald,669 P.2d 818, 64 Or. App.
690 (1983). Recognizes false light.
PENNSYLVANIA
Bromhall v. Rorrik, 478 F. Supp. 361 (E.D.Pa. 1979). Recognizes false light.
RHODE ISLAND
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1985). Recognizes false light.
SOUTH CAROLINA
Holmes v. Curtis Publishing Co., 303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C.
1969). Recognizes false light.
SOUTH DAKOTA
Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 80 S.D. 104, 119
N.W.2d 914 (1963). Recognizes invasion of privacy generally.
TEXAS
Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984). Recognizes
false light.
VIRGINIA
Falwell v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 521 F. Supp.
1204 (W.D. Va. 1981). Recognizes false light.
WASHINGTON
Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wash. 2d 253, 396 P.2d 793 (1964).
Avoids recognizing false light.
WISCONSIN
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.50 (West. 1983). Excludes false light.
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WYOMING
Pring v. Penthouse 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). Implies recognition of false
light.
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APPENDIX D
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 328D (1977) RES IPSA
LOQUITUR
§ 328 D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is
caused by negligence of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the
inference may reasonably be drawn by the jury, or whether it must
necessarily be drawn.
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to be drawn in any case where different conclusions may
reasonably be reached.
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APPENDIX E
SURVEY OF STATE APPLICATION OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR
ALABAMA
Powell v. Mullins, 479 So. 2d 1119 (Ala. 1985).
ALASKA
Lynden Transport, Inc. v. Haragen, 623 P.2d 789 (Alaska
1981).
ARIZONA
Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 118 Ariz. 29, 574 P.2d 822
(1978).
ARKANSAS
Dye v. Burdick, 262 Ark. 124, 553 S.W.2d 833 (1977).
CALIFORNIA
Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 356, 540 P.2d 33, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 193 (1975).
COLORADO
Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, Colo. 619 P.2d 66
(1980).
CONNECTICUT
Bagre v. Daggett Chocolate Co., 126 Conn. 659, 13 A.2d
757 (1940). Puro v. Henry, 188 Conn. 301, 449 A.2d 176
(1982).
DELAWARE
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Magic Chef, 483 A.2d 1115
(Del. 1984).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Otis Elevator Co. v. Henderson No. 85-1126, slip op.
(D.D.C. Aug. 12, 1986)
FLORIDA
Goodyear v. Hughes Supply, 385 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1978).
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